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ELEVEN 
Commodification, Exploitation, 
and the Market for Transplant Organs 
A Discussion of Dirty Pretty Things 
Clark Wolf 
The hotel business is about strangers. And strangers will always surprise 
you, you know? They come to hotels in the night to do dirty things, and in 
the morning it's our job to make things all pretty again. 
SNEAKY, Dirty Pretty Things 
In the film Dirty Pretty Things (Frears 2002), one of the main char-acters, Okwe (played by Chiwetel Ejiofor), discovers that his em-
ployer, "Sneaky" (played by Sergi Lopez), is running a peculiar business. 
During the day Sneaky seems an ordinary hotelier. But on the side he runs 
a service to provide counterfeit passports for illegal immigrants who wish 
to remain in Britain. He arranges for poor immigrants to "donate" one 
of their kidneys, which he sells to people in need of a transplant. In return, 
he provides the "donors" with forged passports or immigration docu-
ments. Unfortunately he employs an incompetent physician to perform 
the surgery. We never discover how many of those who participate in 
Sneaky's scheme die after their kidneys are removed. But what we discover 
about the procedure gives us reason to believe that few could survive. 
In the course of the film, we discover that Okwe is in fact a surgeon 
from Nigeria. Over time, Okwe finds himself drawn further and further 
into Sneaky's world: Sneaky uses Okwe's own goodness as a weapon to 
manipulate him by showing him pictures of a little girl he (Sneaky) says 
will be saved by the pending kidney transplant (Mills 199 5 ). Okwe is also 
drawn in because of his friendship with a Turkish immigrant, Senay 
(played by Audrey Tautou), and his concern to protect her from Sneaky's 
incompetent surgeon. It is Okwe's own virtue that tempts him to partici-
pate in Sneaky's scheme. As Okwe's friend Guo Yi (played by Benedict 
Wong) says, "There's nothing more dangerous than a virtuous man." 
The film raises many different issues, only some of which will be dis-
cussed here. One important issue that occupies center stage is the specific 
problem of whether it is morally permissible for people to sell and buy 
transplant organs. While the arrangement described in the film is horrific, 
some people urge that the main problem with the existing transplant 
organ system is the absence of a legitimate market, rather than the exis-
tence of a black market. Another issue addressed in the film is that of com-
modification or marketization: Are there some things that simply should 
not be bought and sold on an open market, even when the participants 
are consenting adults? Can we legitimately prohibit people from selling 
things they own or control, like their kidneys? Like sex? Finally, there is 
the problem of exploitation: Sneaky exploits people who are willing to 
take an enormous risk only because they are desperate. Is their choice to 
sell their kidneys voluntary, or do the circumstances in which the choice 
is made undermine its freedom? If one judges that the risk of selling her 
kidney is worth taking, do we nonetheless have a right to interfere? 
A Market for Transplant Organs? (Is Sneaky Selling Happiness?) 
If you were just some African, the deal would be simple. You give me your 
kidney; I give you a new identity. I sell the kidney for IO grand, so I am 
happy. The person who needs the kidney gets cured, so he is happy. The 
person who sold his kidney gets to stay in this beautiful country, so he is 
happy. My whole business is based on happiness. 
SNEAKY, Dirty Pretty Things 
As I write this sentence, more than 9o,ooo people in the United States are 
waiting for transplant organs (Institute of Medicine 2006). About 66,ooo 
of them are waiting for kidneys (Postrel2oo6a, 2oo6b). By the time you 
read it, the number will almost certainly be much larger, because people 
are added to the list much faster than they leave it. Some people leave the 
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list when they receive a transplant. But many more will leave the list 
because they will die waiting for one. Every year between four and six 
thousand people in the United States die waiting in vain to receive the 
transplant they would have needed to survive. Today alone more than a 
dozen people will die in the United States because they were unable to 
acquire an appropriate organ for transplant. We have a shortage of trans-
plant organs, and because of this shortage people are dying every day. 
Where might the missing transplant organs come from? Some trans-
plant organs, like hearts, can come available only at the death of the 
donor. Others, like kidneys, can be donated by living individuals. As long 
as one's remaining kidney is functioning normally, a person can live as well 
with one as with two. Donation does increase the donor's risk, however: in 
the event that a donor herself later develops kidney disease, she may have 
given away what would have saved her life. But every year, more than ten 
thousand people die whose organs would be appropriate for transplant, 
but of these only about half actually donate their organs. The problem 
might be solved and lives saved if we could provide a motive or an incen-
tive for those who have not made arrangements to donate their organs. 
What are your options if you are one of those people whose survival 
depends on getting a transplant organ? If you need a kidney transplant, 
you can get on the waiting list and hope that a kidney becomes available 
before your situation becomes critical. If you are fortunate, you may have 
a friend or family member willing to donate an organ to save your health 
or your life. But what if you can't wait that long? What if you know that 
you are among the four thousand who will die this year if you don't 
receive a transplant, and what if the likelihood that you will receive what 
you need is slim? 
If you are wealthy, then you may not need to wait and hope. There is 
an alternative available for you: you could purchase your kidney in a 
thriving international black market. In 2004, the New York Times pub-
lished a detailed account of an international market that connects poor 
organ donors with wealthy Americans in need of organ transplants: 
When Alberty Jose da Silva heard he could make money, lots of 
money, by selling his kidney, it seemed to him the opportunity of a 
lifetime. For a desperately il148-year-old woman in Brooklyn whose 
doctors had told her to get a kidney any way she could, it was. At 3 8, 
17:2 THE GOOD LIFE 
Mr. da Silva, one of 2 3 children of a prostitute, lives in a slum near 
the airport here, in a flimsy two-room shack he shares with a sister 
and nine other people. "As a child, I can remember seven of us shar-
ing a single egg, or living for day after day on just a bit of manioc 
meal with salt," Mr. da Silva said in an interview. He recalled his 
mother as a woman who "sold her flesh" to survive. Last year he 
decided that he would, too. Now, a long scar across his side marks 
the place where a kidney and a rib were removed in exchange for 
$6,ooo, paid by middlemen in an international organ trafficking ring. 
(ROTHER 2004) 
The movie Dirty Pretty Things is a work of fiction. But the problems 
it addresses are real problems that real people face every day. Is it morally 
defensible to allow poor people to sell their organs to rich people? We 
might object that such arrangements are exploitative in the sense that they 
take advantage of the unfortunate predicament of the donors. But some 
might respond that these donors would be better off if they were able to 
sell their kidneys than they would be if they were unable to do so. Those 
who accept payment must value the cash more than they value what 
they're giving up, or else they wouldn't be willing to make the exchange. 
Are there some things that just shouldn't be bought and sold on the mar-
ket? And what right do we have to interfere in a voluntary exchange be-
tween consenting adults? Should people have a right to decide for them-
selves which risks they should take and which they should avoid, or do 
we have a right to intervene and make the decision for them? 
Perhaps the reason we prohibit people from selling their kidneys for 
transplant is that this procedure involves risks for the donor. Still, under 
most circumstances people are responsible for their own risks, and other 
people have no right to intervene to prevent them from taking risks they 
themselves have considered and accepted. If I wish to run risks by biking 
to work (which involves much greater personal risk than driving a car 
would), or to spend my leisure time climbing cliffs, the decision is my 
own. In these cases, you could pay me to take the risk in question without 
violating the law. But in the United States, if you pay me to have my kid-
ney removed, you (and I) have violated the law. What is the difference 
between these cases? If the risks are comparable, why do we allow the law 
to intervene in one case and not in the others? 
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Consider the arrangement from the perspective of the donor: Alberty 
da Silva received six thousand dollars for his kidney. As long as he was 
appropriately informed about the risks he undertook, what right have we 
to tell him that the risk is too great? The woman who received Mr. da 
Silva's kidney was apparently out of options. She told Larry Rother, of the 
New York Times, "My doctors told me to 'get a kidney any way I could' 
or expect to die" (Rother 2004). Several economically strapped countries 
now advertise themselves as good places for surgical operations; large 
numbers of wealthy Americans and Europeans now go abroad to South 
Africa or to India for surgery that would be prohibitively expensive in 
their home countries (Alsever 2oo6). This facilitates the flow of money 
and resources from the developed world toward cash-strapped nations in 
the global South. Economists urge that such trade arrangements are more 
effective than international aid packages that seek to promote economic 
security in poor countries. If these arrangements are advantageous for 
everyone involved, if they save the lives of people who would otherwise 
die, then what justification can we give for the laws that prevent them? 
No justification for such prohibitions seems immediately apparent; how-
ever, if these trade arrangements involve organ donation from the desper-
ate to the well-heeled, the practice in this case seems exploitative. 
According to John Stuart Mill's famous "harm principle," state inter-
vention in individual behavior is justified only to prevent harm to others. 
When other people make choices we disapprove of, we may let them know; 
but if their questionable choices are harmless, or harm no one but them-
selves, we have no right to interfere. However, one need not accept Mill's 
harm principle to think that legislation that limits people's liberty must be 
justified by very good reasons, especially when we are preventing people 
from doing things that will save lives. The prohibition on kidney sales in-
terferes with people's voluntary choices and prevents them from engaging 
in a life-preserving exchange. Unless there are very strong reasons to jus-
tify interference with such exchanges, we should not interfere. 
Persuaded by this argument, many economists and bioethicists urge 
that we should change the existing practice by opening up a legal, regu-
lated market for transplant organs (Boudreaux and Pritchard 1999; Mor-
ley 2003; Roth et al. 2004). In the case of organs like kidneys, which can 
be given by living donors, this could involve a direct market linking donors 
who would sell their organs to the recipients who would buy them. But 
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arrangements could also be made for the post-mortem sale of transplant 
organs: donors could arrange for payment to be made to their families 
and heirs at the time of death. In this way, organ donation could become 
an additional life-insurance policy benefiting bereaved families who may 
need resources to help compensate from lost income due to a wage-
earner's death. For some families, such a benefit could be very important 
indeed, so this might provide a powerful incentive to donate for people 
whose organs would otherwise be buried with them. 
Sneaky claims, in the quotation at the head of this section, that his 
"whole business is based on happiness." Of course, he is lying: his busi-
ness is based on blood and death, not on happiness. Because he doesn't 
care about the welfare of the penniless and powerless donors, he is able 
to exploit them for their organs without concerning himself with their 
welfare. Some-perhaps most of them-pay for their forged passports 
and identification papers with their lives. But defenders of a legal and 
regulated market for transplant organs would not regard this as an objec-
tion to their position: if we leave such arrangements to the black market, 
or force them underground with legislative prohibition, we should expect 
that the market will be managed by unscrupulous criminals like Sneaky. 
To avoid this, we would need to regulate the practice of organ transfer 
and to insure appropriate care for donors and recipients. But regulation 
will only become possible when the practice itself becomes legal. 
If these arguments are correct, then the following would be true: 
(I) An appropriately regulated market for transplant organs could improve 
the situation of everyone involved in it. (2) Only if such markets are legal 
can they be appropriately regulated. (3) Unregulated markets will exist 
even if the sale of transplant organs is declared illegal, because some des-
perate people will do whatever they can to preserve their lives, and because 
there are plenty of people who would be willing to provide transplant 
organs on the black market. 
These considerations constitute a powerful argument in favor of a 
policy that would open up a legal and legitimate market for transplant 
organs. To evaluate the argument more fully, we would need to articulate 
the details of the policy with precision. Then we would need to compare 
it with the status quo and with other plausible alternatives. We would also 
need to address specific objections that would apply to any such policy-
objections that are brilliantly explored in the film under consideration. 
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Here we will consider two such objections: the first urges that some things 
simply should not be bought and sold-should not, by their very nature, 
be turned into commodities. The second common objection appeals to 
considerations of justice: it urges that a market for transplant organs 
would facilitate the exploitation of the weak and poor by the strong and 
the wealthy. The next two sections of this chapter will address each of 
these concerns. 
Questionable Commodification of Sex and Kidneys 
(Selling What Should Not Be Sold?) 
TRANSPLANT ORGAN COURIER: How come I've never seen you people 
before? 
OKWE: It is because we are the people you do not see. We are the ones who 
drive your cabs, who clean your rooms, and suck your cocks. 
It is often argued that there are some things that just shouldn't be bought 
and sold-shouldn't be turned into "commodities" (Radin 1996). Con-
sider sex first: Juliette (played by Sophie Okonedo) is a "sex-worker," a 
prostitute who provides sexual services to anyone who can afford to pay. 
Like a kidney, sex is often regarded as something that should not be ex-
changed for money, and indeed many nations and states have laws pro-
hibiting prostitution for just this reason. 
Different reasons can be given in defense of laws prohibiting prostitu-
tion: Sometimes it is argued that such laws promote gender equality, be-
cause women who are prostitutes do not interact on equal terms with 
those who pay them for sex. Or it may be argued that prostitution often 
involves serious risks to health, and other risks as well, because prostitutes 
are often the victims of criminal violence. It may also be argued that 
prostitution alienates people from their own sexuality, changing the mean-
ing of sex from an expression of tenderness and affection into a mere 
market exchange (Nussbaum 1999 ). 
The character of Juliette invites us to question all of these assump-
tions: she is presented as a strong and sensitive person with a powerful 
sense of self-respect. Her strength, humor, and compassion make it pos-
sible for her to comfort Senay after Senay has been abused and (arguably) 
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raped by Sneaky. In many respects, Juliette appears to be the strongest and 
most well-adjusted person in the film. 
Of course, Juliette is a fictional character and represents a common 
stereotype: a well-adjusted "hooker with a heart of gold" appears in many 
films. The stereotypic image may be appealing in part because it provides 
false comfort for people who would rather not think about the squalid, 
dangerous, and unfortunate lives many prostitutes endure. In the real 
world, prostitution exposes women to very serious risks, both physical 
and psychological. And it seems plausible that these dangers do stem from 
the problematic commodification of the body that prostitution involves. 
It would be better from the moral point of view if people expressed ten-
derness and affection in their sex lives instead of turning them into mere 
exchanges. But even if we grant all of these points it would not follow that 
laws prohibiting prostitution are justifiable: In most circumstances, peo-
ple have a right to engage in mutually consensual though morally ques-
tionable relationships with each other, and third parties do not have a 
valid claim to interfere. Beyond this, it is quite clear that laws prohibiting 
prostitution "punish the victims," because the penalties fall hardest on 
those who engage in it, not on their customers (Nussbaum I999). Laws 
criminalizing prostitution cannot possibly be justified on grounds that 
they protect or benefit the women who are or who would otherwise be-
come prostitutes. 
In a similar vein, it can be argued that people should not commodify 
their bodies and their internal organs. This reasoning is often used to jus-
tify the prohibition on organ sales. Arguably, there is something morally 
problematic about viewing our bodies or body parts as commodities to 
be bought and sold. But to urge that commodification is morally prob-
lematic is not enough to show that other people are justified to interfere 
with those who are forced by circumstances to make tragicchoices. Just 
as it seems to be worse for poor women when prostitution is made illegal, 
it may be worse for poor people when they are unable to make their own 
decisions whether or not to turn their spare kidneys into cash. 
Perhaps there really is something morally problematic about the com-
modification of bodily organs. Maybe people shouldn't consider their 
body parts as marketable items ready to be sold to the highest bidder. But 
if so, then the badness of such commodification must be set against the 
competing reasons that militate in favor of legal and regulated markets for 
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transplant organs: in particular, the possibility that such markets might 
improve the situation of everyone involved and might save the lives of 
thousands of people who need transplants. It is not obvious that this point 
about commodification provides any conclusive reason against either laws 
prohibiting prostitution or laws prohibiting a market for transplant 
organs. It is legally and socially permissible to sell some body products, 
including human eggs, blood, and sperm. If we are not bothered by mar-
kets for these items, then isn't the concern about the commodification of 
transplant organs overblown? 
Some things should not be available on a market at any price: the 
prohibition on slavery means that we can't buy people. The prohibition 
on some other things, like child sex, is uncontroversial. It seems clear that 
people and children should not be commodified in these ways, and we 
have good reasons that underlie our concerns in these cases. But where 
we object that it is inappropriate to commodify some item, we should be 
able to articulate the moral reasons that lie behind our objection. It is not 
enough to use the commodification objection as a conversation stopper, 
especially where people's lives and well-being are at stake. In this case, 
since people are literally dying every day because of the lack of transplant 
organs, the commodification argument must be supported with the stron-
gest underlying reasons and argument. Unless we have such an argument, 
the claim that we should not commodify our bodies is not by itself a 
strong enough reason to forbid a market for transplant organs. 
Injustice and Exploitative Offers (Leveraging Personal 
Advantage from the Poor and Desperate?) 
For you and me, there is only survival. 
OKWE 
Financial incentives [for transplant organs] might disproportionately affect 
the poor or other marginalized groups, and might also cause a drop in 
donations for altruistic reasons if people see donated organs as goods with 
a certain market value. And nonfinancial incentives, such as reciprocity 
agreements, might disadvantage those who are less informed about organ 
donation and therefore increase existing social inequality. 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT 
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Why does Senay consent to trade her kidney for a passport? It is because 
she is absolutely desperate. Why did Alberty da Silva sell his kidney for 
six thousand dollars? Because he was very poor and needed the money. It 
is worth asking whether such exchanges are impermissibly exploitative in 
the sense that they take advantage of people who are very poor and who 
would not be willing to put their lives and health at risk if they were not 
desperate. When Okwe tells Senay "For you and me, there is only sur-
vival" he drives home the point that they have few options. Senay's life in 
London is intolerably bad. She concludes that her only option, the only 
thing she can do to pursue her hope for a decent life, is to sell her kidney 
to Sneaky. If people are willing to sell their kidneys only because they have 
no other options, is their decision even voluntary? In such a situation, is 
a purchase offer exploitative? 
To understand the sense in which these arrangements may be imper-
missibly exploitative, we need to distinguish between at least two different 
senses of the term exploitation, which will be explored below. 
EI-Exploitation: A exploits B when A intentionally causes B to fall 
into an unfortunate predicament, and then uses B's misfortune as a 
lever to manipulate B into doing what A wants B to do. 
Er-exploitation is the classic sense of the term found in the writings 
of Karl Marx (r8r8-r883). Marx regarded capitalists as not only the 
cause of the misery of workers but also as persons who take advantage of 
the misery they have created to increase their own wealth and power. An 
example may help to make the moral objection to Er-exploitative arrange-
ments clear: 
Example: Alph meets Beth at a bar, and she tells him she's planning 
to drive out into the desert. While she's in the bathroom, Alph sidles 
out to Beth's car, slashes the spare, and puts a slow leak in one of the 
tires. Then as Beth heads out for the desert, Alph quietly finishes his 
beer, planning to go out to find Beth after the tire goes flat and after 
enough time has passed that her life is in danger from the heat. On 
finding desperate Beth, Alph offers to sell her his spare provided that 
she signs over the deed to her house and pays him all the money in 
her savings account. 
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The existing black market for kidneys is not Er-exploitative unless 
those who arrange for the sale of transplant organs intentionally put the 
prospective donors into the desperate predicament that renders them will-
ing to sell. In the case of Alberty da Silva and others involved in the South 
African transplant ring discussed above, da Silva's poverty was not caused 
by those who offered to buy his kidney. And in Dirty Pretty Things, the 
desperation of the poor immigrants who sell their kidneys is not caused 
by Sneaky; he just takes advantage of their plight. We need another sense 
of exploitation to identify the problem: 
Ez-Exploitation: B is in an unfortunate predicament, for which A is 
not responsible. But A takes advantage of the unfortunate predica-
ment of B, using B's misfortune as a lever to manipulate B into doing 
what A wants B to do. 
Once again, an example may make this clear: 
Example: Alph is driving through the desert and by chance finds Beth 
stuck on the road in a desperate and life-threatening situation with a 
flat tire and no spare. Alph offers to sell Beth his spare tire provided 
that she signs over the deed to her house and pays Alph all the money 
in her savings account. 
In this case, Alph does not intentionally cause Beth's misfortune; he 
just takes advantage of it. While his offer may save her life, clearly he 
doesn't deserve any praise for making it. While there is clearly something 
seriously wrong with arrangements like this one, it does not follow that 
anyone else has a right to interfere with Ez-exploitative arrangements 
unless they are also willing to do something to improve the predicament 
of the person who is exploited (Sample 2003). Legislative prohibition of 
Ez-exploitative arrangements would certainly be misplaced if the object 
of such legislation were to improve the situation of the exploited. 
One might be inclined to regard Sneaky's exploitation of poor immi-
grants as Ez-exploitation. Sneaky doesn't directly or intentio~ally cause 
the poverty and desperation of those he exploits. If their predicament is 
unjust (as it certainly is), he is no more responsible than others-no more 
responsible than we are, for example-for the initial injustice that leaves 
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them willing to take an enormous risk. E2-exploitation leaves its victims 
better off than they would otherwise be. But because his surgeon is incom-
petent, because Sneaky doesn't care whether the donors live or die, those 
who sell their kidneys to him are much worse off as a result. So even if we 
accept the view that third parties usually have no business interfering with 
E2-exploitative arrangements, it would certainly not follow that we 
should leave Sneaky to continue to exploit (and murder) his victims. 
What is peculiar about E2-exploitation is that the exploitative offer 
actually improves the situation of the person who is exploited. This is not 
the case for Er-exploitation. If we were to prohibit Alph from selling the 
tire to Beth in this outrageous offer, as a result she will be even worse off 
than she already is. Some people take this fact as a conclusive argument 
that E2-exploitation is not unfair to those who are exploited. Thus, Sally 
Satel writes, in the New York Times: 
Some critics worry that compensation for kidney donation by the liv-
ing would be most attractive to the poor and hence exploit them. But 
if it were government-regulated we could ensure that donors would 
receive education about their choices, undergo careful medical and 
psychological screening and receive quality follow-up care. We could 
even make a donation option that favors th~ well-off by rewarding 
donors with a tax credit. Besides, how is it unfair to poor people if 
compensation enhances their quality of life? (sATEL 2006) 
Satel's argument radically understates the moral problems involved. 
We should be troubled by the case of Alberty da Silva, whose poverty 
drove him to give up his kidney. It is certainly unfair in an ordinary sense 
that some people are born to poverty and cruelly limited opportunities. A 
world that includes unfairness of this kind is unjust in a significant sense. 
If we could eliminate the injustice that left Mr. da Silva in this predica-
ment, then perhaps he would be less willing to sell his kidney. We should 
at least expect that he would demand a higher market price. 
The relatively well-off citizens of wealthy nations do not intentionally 
cause the poverty of people like Alberty da Silva. It follows from this that 
their interactions with him are not Er-exploitative. But it would be a 
mistake to assume that the wealth and security enjoyed by people in eco-
nomically strong nations is unconnected with the predicament of people 
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in poor countries. As Thomas Pogge (2002) pointed out, our wealth is 
supported in part by institutions that impose serious disadvantages on 
poor people in authoritarian nations. 
One such institution is the "international borrowing privilege," which 
allows dictators in poor countries to obtain money and credit on the 
international market and to assign the debt to their nation. Thus, a dicta-
tor might borrow money in the name of the nation and use these funds to 
secure power and to forcefully eliminate political opposition. Obviously 
the people of the nation gain no benefits from this borrowing: the benefits 
are entirely private and enjoyed by the dictator. But if he is later deposed, 
the subsequent regime inherits the obligation to pay off the debts of the 
previous regime. Thus, the system of international lending and debt can 
sometimes operate to fund the oppression of the poor people in a poor 
country, who then inherit the obligation to pay for the cost of their own 
earlier oppression. 
While we may not participate directly in this institution of interna-
tional lending and what is known as odious debt, these lending practices 
have a decisive impact on the strength of First World economies and the 
rate of interest available within the United States. If you have a credit card 
or pay a mortgage, then in a direct way you enjoy benefits that are created, 
in part, by an institution that facilitates the poverty and oppression of 
poor people who live under repressive political regimes. While we do not 
directly or intentionally cause these people's poverty and desperation, nei-
ther are we unconnected or uninvolved third parties. Our situation rela-
tive to people who live in poor countries would seem to be intermediate 
between the two concepts of exploitation identified above. This fact is 
significant from the moral point of view: to the extent that we are impli-
cated in the poverty of those with whom we interact-that is, to the extent 
that our wealth depends on institutions that cause them harm-we have 
positive obligations to rectify the injustices involved. But if we take ad-
vantage of the poverty of people who are badly off because of institutions 
that benefit us, our relationship with them comes much closer to being 
EI-exploitation and is even more problematic from the moral point of 
v1ew. 
Ideally, we might wish to provide Mr. da Silva with opportunities that 
his life does not now present. Arguably, justice requires that we do this. 
But if we are unable to address the underlying injustice that caused his 
182 THE GOOD LIFE 
poverty and the poverty of millions of others like him, then we are not 
justified in stepping in to prevent him from exercising the problematic 
opportunity that presented itself to him-the opportunity to sell his kid-
ney in a problematic and (probably) exploitative arrangement. If he is ap-
propriately informed about the risks involved (Rother 2004 provides 
evidence that da Silva was not appropriately informed), if he nonetheless 
judges that the risk associated with donating a kidney is worth six thou-
sand dollars to him, who are we to tell him that he is making the wrong 
choice? Unless we are willing to step in and eliminate the initial injustice 
that leaves him in a situation where he is willing to accept this problematic 
offer, we have no right to prevent him from improving his situation by 
accepting such an offer. 
If we were to put in place a legal and regulated market for transplant 
organs, we would need to insure that those participating in this market 
had a clear understanding of the risks involved. We would need to insure 
that people whose kidneys (or other organs) are removed must receive 
proper follow-up care and that the arrangement in which they participate 
does not take advantage of their ignorance or poverty. Those who would 
argue for the elimination of the present system should be prepared to offer 
a specific proposal to insure appropriate regulations to protect the inter-
ests of everyone involved in such transactions. 
Conclusion 
Where do these considerations leave us? If you are one of the 66,ooo 
people who are waiting for a transplant organ, the current situation is bad 
indeed. Unless the system is dramatically changed, most of the people who 
are presently waiting on that list will die waiting. Their deaths, inevitable 
under the current U.S. system, could be avoided if we could increase the 
number of transplant organs available. Providing financial incentives for 
donors would almost certainly accomplish this. 
Above we have considered several important reasons that are typi-
cally used to justify the current system. Some of these reasons are signifi-
cant from the moral point of view: perhaps it is unfortunate and undesir-
able for people to commodify their bodies. And certainly we should do 
what we can to promote justice and to avoid exploitative arrangements. 
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However, we need to decide whether these reasons are sufficiently weighty 
to justify the deaths of those who die every day waiting for a transplant 
organ. 
Paying for organs, from the living or deceased, may seem distasteful. 
But a system with safeguards, begun as a pilot to resolve ethical and 
practical aspects, is surely preferable to the status quo that allows 
thousands to die each year. As the International Forum for Transplant 
Ethics put it: "The well-known shortage of kidneys for transplanta-
tion causes much suffering and death. If we are to deny treatment to 
the suffering and dying, we need better reasons than our own feelings 
of disgust." (SATEL 2006) 
Those who argue against the development of a market for transplant 
organs must face the fact that the system for which they argue is respon-
sible for a massive number of unnecessary deaths. But those who regard 
the present system as unjustifiable also have a burden to bear: It must be 
shown that a market for transplant organs can effectively and appropri-
ately protect the interests of everyone involved in it. Then we need to 
persuade our politicians to put it in place. 
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 
r. If you were in Senay's shoes, would you sell your kidney given the 
nature of the bargain in the film? To what extent is Senay's choice free or 
coerced? In what way would you say that she is being exploited by the 
arrangement? 
2. If permitting a legal, regulated market in kidney sales would, for 
reasons given by Pogge, constitute a legal sanctioning of the exploitation 
of poor persons in the developing world, wouldn't this be reason enough 
to prohibit such a market? Explain why or why not. 
3. Are there some things that just shouldn't be commodified, like 
kidneys or sex? Come up with the best moral argument you can make for 
why some things should not be allowed to be bought and sold. Should the 
law also prohibit such commodification, on the moral grounds you de-
scribe? Why or why not? 
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